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Abstract
A careful approach needs to be taken by antitrust authorities in the assessment of the possible
exclusionary effects of conglomerate mergers on competitive conditions. In general, conglomerate
mergers will raise concerns when they make the leverage of market power possible, thus having as
their effect or object a foreclosure of the market to effective competition. The resulting competitive
harm stems from the accumulation of substantial market power across complementary products
or product ranges that, not being based on normal business performance or competition on the
merits, may substantially reduce consumers’ choice and ultimately lead to higher prices and a loss
of welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
Conglomerate mergers are mergers between firms that have
no existing or potential competitive relationship either as direct
competitors or as suppliers and customers. Most frequently,
conglomerate mergers involve suppliers of complementary prod-
ucts or of products belonging to a range that is generally sold to,
and requested by, the same set of intermediate or final custom-
ers.
It is generally claimed that because conglomerate mergers
do not result either in direct horizontal overlaps or in vertical
relationships, they should be viewed as having a positive or at
least neutral effect on competition. While it can be reasonably
accepted that conglomerate mergers may not be anticompetitive
per se, the conglomerate aspects of mergers may constitute an
additional factor, either aggravating or mitigating, to existing
horizontal and/or vertical effects. A careful approach needs to
be taken by antitrust authorities in the assessment of the possible
exclusionary effects of conglomerate mergers on competitive
conditions. In general, conglomerate mergers will raise con-
cerns when they make the leverage of market power possible,
thus having as their effect or object a foreclosure of the market
to effective competition. The resulting competitive harm stems
from the accumulation of substantial market power across com-
plementary products or product ranges that, not being based on
normal business performance or competition on the merits, may
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substantially reduce consumers' choice and ultimately lead to
higher prices and a loss of welfare. Conglomerate analysis there-
fore has to proceed with the subtle distinction between competi-
tion on the merits and market exclusion based on anticompeti-
tive aims. As far as the exclusionary effects of conglomerate
mergers are concerned, there is a clear parallel to be made with
vertical effects, since in economic terms the exclusion mecha-
nism in the context of vertical integration functions in a similar
way as in the context of a merger of complements.
Although there is no explicitly stated framework for the
analysis of conglomerate mergers either under the EC Merger
Regulation or in other jurisdictions, there is general agreement
that the analysis of conglomerate effects has to undergo a cer-
tain number of steps. Several conditions relating, inter alia, to
the nature of the products concerned, the nature of the industry
in question, and the degree of market power held by the merg-
ing parties pre-merger must be examined.
First, the definition of the individual products and/or ser-
vices, as well as their evaluation in the combined product range,
are key elements in the analysis of conglomerate mergers. The
product markets in conglomerate mergers are usually neighbor-
ing or related markets, a concept intended to describe a demand
side linkage between markets (i.e., a significant degree of com-
monality in terms of buyers served). The clearest example of
such a linkage would be complementary or slightly substitutable
products. Under certain circumstances, the combination of
such products alters the structure of the markets concerned,
thus giving the merged firm the ability and the economic incen-
tive to change its pricing behavior. This so-called "Cournot" ef-
fect of conglomerate mergers stems from the fact that they en-
able the merged entity to internalize price externalities arising
from the fact that the combined products are technical comple-
ments (e.g., one cannot function without the other), economic
complements (e.g., products which are consumed together), or
commercial complements (e.g., when they form part of a range
which downstream agents need to carry).
Second, when the merging firm enjoys market power in one
or more of the complementary products in the range, a change
in its pricing behavior may be motivated by the possibility of
leveraging its existing market power into one or more of the
products in the combined product range. Complementary
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products sold to the same customers and viewed by the latter as
constituting an essential part of their requirements are more
likely to make leveraging more profitable. In this case, leverag-
ing may translate into various types of practices, such as product
tying, which may be based on pressure or incentives vis-a-vis
downstream agents. Examples of this abound, such as commer-
cial tying in the form of a refusal to supply, mixed bundling
based on the variation in the pricing structure in the product
range, and technical tying. In addition to these, where the
merger brings about an accumulation of financial strength,
cross-subsidization and predation may facilitate the pricing flexi-
bility in the product range and thus constitute an additional mo-
tivation for the leveraging of market power.
Third, the assessment of conglomerate aspects also involves
an examination of the specific characteristics of the markets con-
cerned. For instance, the existence of buyer power may act as a
constraining factor on the leveraging of market power. The
same applies to the existence of competing suppliers capable of
proposing alternative and equally attractive product ranges.
Moreover, in industries displaying high entry barriers, high sunk
costs, long payback or break-even periods, imperfect capital mar-
kets, intensive research and development, and high investment
costs, the competitive constraint coming from competitors may
not be sufficient to counter the incentive and ability of the
merged firm to leverage its pre-merger market power. The exis-
tence of significant financial strength on behalf of the merged
firm may be an aggravating factor in such a case. However, fi-
nancial strength has to be analyzed on a case-by-case and indus-
try-by-industry basis, to determine whether it is an important ele-
ment of the overall conglomerate analysis. The assessment of
financial strength has nothing to do with any so-called "big is
bad" argument; indeed, the Commission has never pursued any
policy in this direction and has never challenged mergers on the
basis of the sheer size of the merging companies.
Fourth, the existence of market power or dominance in at
least one of the pre-merger complementary products is a neces-
sary condition for the likelihood and the profitability of leverag-
ing practices. This is more so when both merging firms have
strong market positions in their respective markets, such as the
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recent GE/Honeywell case,1 where a dominant firm in one of the
complementary markets proposed to acquire the leading sup-
plier in the other market. To date, the European Commission
has challenged the leveraging effects of conglomerate mergers
only when market power existed prior to the merger in at least
one of the markets comprising the combined product range.
Some forms of post-merger pricing in conglomerate merg-
ers may act in favor of downstream agents. For instance, mixed
bundling can create incentives to customers in the form of re-
bates and other advantages. Such advantages, however, can be
short-lived and take the form of strategic pricing. To the extent
that pro-competitive efficiencies may constitute one of the rea-
sons to approve a merger, antitrust authorities have to proceed
with a critical analysis of the possible efficiencies they are likely
to produce. When significant efficiencies are claimed, antitrust
authorities will have to establish whether such efficiencies are
real. This is essentially an analysis of whether the claimed effi-
ciencies are likely to be structural and permanent and ultimately
to reduce the marginal costs of producing/distributing the prod-
ucts and/or services in a sustainable way so that the benefits will
truly be passed on to the consumers. Antitrust authorities will
then have to analyze whether the claimed efficiencies are
merger-specific and sufficient to co unter the effect on price that
the potential foreclosure effects of market power leveraging are
likely to produce. Finally, they will have to make the trade-off
between efficiency gains and losses from the restriction of com-
petition and ascertain that the initial efficiencies are not later
extinguished through the elimination of competition and subse-
quent price increases.
I. TYPES OF LEVERAGING EFFECTS
As mentioned previously, conglomerate mergers raise com-
petitive concerns when they can afford the supplier of a range of
complementary products the possibility and the economic incen-
tive to leverage its market power in one of the complements into
another. This leverage of market power may take on one or a
combination of the forms described below.
1. GE/Honeywell, Case No. COMP/M.2220 (2001) (Comm'n).
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A. Commercial Tying Based on Pressure on Downstream Agents
A conglomerate merger may enable the merged firm to
pressure customers through the threat to refuse to supply one of
the products in the range unless they also buy other products in
the range or through the obligation imposed on customers to
buy the whole range (full-line forcing). The possible anticompe-
titive effect of this type of product tying relies on the ability and
the incentive of the merged firm enjoying market power in one
market, the "tying market," to leverage this market power into
another market, the "tied market."
The concept of the creation or strengthening of market
power in non-horizontally or non-vertically related markets as a
result of this type of product tying is not novel in EC antitrust
analysis. Product tying has been analyzed in the practice of the
European Commission and the case law of the European Court
of Justice on various occasions, either under Article 82 of the EC
Treaty (abuse of dominant position) or under the EC Merger
Regulation.
Article 82(d) of the EC Treaty provides that an abuse may
consist of making the conclusion of contracts subject to accept-
ance by the other parties of supplementary obligations that, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connec-
tion with the subject of such contracts. This provision refers to
situations where a firm that holds a dominant position in one
product forces its customers to purchase this product together
with other products in which it is not necessarily dominant. Its
objective is to prevent the distortion of competition in the tied
product market by reducing the competitive thrust of competing
suppliers active in this market, eventually forcing them to exit
that market. The classic example of product tying under Article
82 is found in the Hilti case.2
Hilti concerned a company trading in nail guns and their
accessories (cartridge strips and nails) which attempted to elimi-
nate independent producers of nails compatible with its guns by,
first, selling its cartridge strips only to those customers who
agreed to buy its nails and, second, by reducing the discounts to
customers who bought its cartridge strips and compatible nails
2. Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti, O.J. L 65/19 (1988); see also Hilti AG v. Comm'n, Case T-
30/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1439; Hilti AG v. Comm'n, Case C-53/92P, [1994] E.C.R. 1-667
(upholding Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti).
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from competing suppliers. The Commission considered that
this form of product tying constituted an anticompetitive exclu-
sionary practice.
In another case, Tetra Pak II, the Court of First Instance3
and the Court of Justice4 confirmed the Commission's finding
that Tetra Pak had committed abuses in the markets for non-
aseptic packaging machines and non-aseptic cartons (the "tied
markets"), through Tetra Pak's dominant position in the mar-
kets for aseptic packaging machines and aseptic cartons (the "ty-
ing markets"). The leverage of market power from the "tying
markets" to the neighboring "tied markets" through product ty-
ing was justified by a series of factors, such as the fact that Tetra
Pak held a leading position in the "tying markets," the strong
links existing between the two markets, the fact that the products
in both markets were used for the same purposes (that is, pack-
aging the same final products), and that a substantial part of
Tetra Pak's customers and competitors operated in both mar-
kets.
Under the EC Merger Regulation the Commission has chal-
lenged mergers on the basis of leveraging of market power
through product tying in several cases concerning consumer
goods. In its decision in the case Coca-Cola/Amalgamated Bever-
ages GB,5 the Commission examined whether the constitution of
a broad range or portfolio of soft drink brands would confer on
the Coca-Cola Company the possibility of using its beverage port-
folio to its advantage, for instance by leveraging its strong posi-
tion in Coca-Cola (the "tying market") into other products of the
portfolio. In the same sector, the Commission examined
whether the constitution of a portfolio of carbonated soft drinks,
packaged water, and beer might give "each of the brands in the
portfolio greater market power than if they were sold on a stand
alone basis" and subsequently concluded that such a portfolio
would strengthen the existing dominant position of one of the
firms in the "tying market."6
In the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan7 case the merger analysis
focused on the non-horizontal effects resulting from the forma-
3. Tetra Pak Int'l v. Comm'n, Case T-83/91, [1994] E.C.R. 11-755.
4. Tetra Pak Int'l v. Comm'n, Case C-333/94P, [1996] E.C.R. 1-5951.
5. Coca-Cola/Amalgamated Beverages GB, O.J. L 218/15 (1997).
6. The Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S, OJ. L 145/41 (1998).
7. Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, O.J. L 288/24 (1998).
UNBUNDLING GE/HONEYWELL
tion of a wide portfolio of product brands across various catego-
ries of spirits, which constituted separate but closely related
product markets. The assessment was based on the finding that
when elements of market power are combined, the whole might
be greater than the sum of the parts. Therefore, although indi-
vidual leverage possibilities might have existed prior to the
merger, the combined leverage possibilities post-merger,
through product tying, became greater than the sum of the indi-
vidual possibilities pre-merger. The decision outlined some of
the advantages that a comprehensive portfolio of goods may
grant to the merged firm. For instance, the bargaining position
of the merged firm in relation to customers would become
stronger owing to the fact that the broader offering of its prod-
ucts would account for a substantial part of the customers' re-
quirements, thus making the implicit or explicit threat of a re-
fusal to supply more potent. The Guinness decision set out cer-
tain conditions under which a combined product portfolio may
result in the creation or reinforcement of dominance, such as
whether downstream agents purchased a range of products
among which the combined portfolio accounted for a significant
proportion; whether market power existed in one or more "tying
markets" (in this case leading brands of spirits, also referred to
as "must stocks") among the products constituting the portfolio;
the market shares of the various other products of the portfolio
in relation to the shares of competitors; the relative importance
of the individual spirit markets in the portfolio in terms of their
sales in the total sales of spirits; the relative strength of competi-
tors' individual products or portfolios; and finally, the prospects
for the exercise of countervailing buyer power and for potential
competition through entry or expansion.
In the above cases, the Commission considered the ability
and incentive of firms to leverage power in one market to the
benefit of a product in another complementary, non-competing
but closely related market. The main criticism of product tying
as a profitable exclusionary practice has been based on the the-
ory developed in the so-called Chicago School of thought, that
is, that there is only one monopoly profit to be made and the
firm active in the tying market can make this profit simply
through its pricing in this market. This line of thinking is, how-
ever, based on theoretical assumptions that are not always true
in real life, such as that the "tied market" is purely competitive or
2002]
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that the two products are used in fixed quantities. The most re-
cent line of thinking is that if competition in both markets is
imperfect, tying can, under certain conditions, change the mar-
ket structure of the tied market by excluding or eliminating ri-
vals.8
These conditions have generally been met in the Commis-
sion's assessment of product tying under either Article 82 of the
EC treaty or the Merger Regulation. Thus the condition of the
existence of market power in the tying market has been met in
the finding of a dominant position (for example, nail guns in
Hilti or in Coca-Cola Classic in the Coca-Cola cases) or in the
existence of a must-stock brand (for example, in the Guinness
and Coca-Cola cases). Indeed, it can be reasonably argued that a
firm which lacks market power in the tying market may not have
the ability to leverage such market power to the tied market. An-
other condition is that the firm must have the economic incen-
tive and ability to commit to a tying strategy. For instance, the
Commission may assess the credibility of the threat to refuse to
supply customers unless they buy both the tying and the tied
products or to impose on them full-line forcing. In general, the
refusal to supply the tied product separately from the tying prod-
uct would not be credible where the firm faces a disproportion-
ate risk of failing to sell both products, thus losing profits in both
product markets. For instance, in the presence of "must-stock"
products, the Commission considered that the inelasticity of
consumer demand for such products makes that threat credible.
In merger cases, the Commission also assesses a third condition,
namely whether tying has as a consequence the reduction of
competition in the markets, as a result of the foreclosure,
marginalization, or elimination of competing suppliers. For ex-
ample, in the Guinness and Coca-Cola cases, the Commission
found that competing suppliers would be permanently fore-
closed from a substantial amount of market outlets, as a result of
tying practices on behalf of the merged firm.
B. Commercial Tying Based on Pricing Incentives
Conglomerate mergers may also change the pricing behav-
ior of the merged firm as a result of the constitution of a wide
8. NERA Competition Brief, Beyond Bork: New Economic Theories of Exclusion in
Merger Cases (Aug. 2000).
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range of product offerings. In such a case, complementary prod-
ucts may be sold together at a price that, owing to the flexibility
of the merged firm in structuring discounts across the combined
product range, is lower than the price charged when they are
sold separately. As a result of the combination of a broad range
of complementary products, the merged firm may have the fi-
nancial ability and incentive to cross-subsidize discounts across
the products of the range, thus granting rebates that are condi-
tional on the purchase of all products in that range. Such a
practice enables the firm to 'lock-in' its customers, notably
through the possibility to price discriminate vis-A-vis those who
reveal their preference to buy the whole range or separate prod-
ucts thereof. Similarly, in the Hoffman-La Roche case, the Court
of Justice examined, under Article 82, the grant of discounts
which were conditional on the customer's purchasing the whole
range of the firm's products (vitamins) and considered this prac-
tice as constituting an exclusionary abuse when performed by a
dominant undertaking.'
In the same spirit, the Michelin Court stated "no discount
should be granted (by a dominant firm) unless linked to a genu-
ine cost reduction in the manufacturer's costs." 10 The Court
pointed out that competing suppliers of automobile tires may be
foreclosed as a result of such practices owing to the fact that cus-
tomers would be unlikely to switch suppliers or deal with other
suppliers at any point during the reference period (one year) for
fear of not qualifying for the rebate. As in the case of product
tying, the underlying concern of mixed bundling is that such a
practice may have a tying effect on customers, thereby considera-
bly foreclosing the market to competing suppliers.
This is particularly true in the case of conglomerate merg-
ers, where competing suppliers of individual, stand-alone prod-
ucts are unable to replicate the post-merger behavior of the
merged entity due to the limited number of products in their
portfolio. Thus, in Guinness, the Commission considered that
the constitution of a broad portfolio of spirits would give the
merged firm the flexibility to structure prices, promotions, and
discounts and have a reasonably greater potential for product
9. Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm'n, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461.
10. Nederlandsche Baden-Industrie Michelin NV v. Comm'n, Case 322/81, [1983]
E.C.R. 3461.
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tying.1' In a more recent decision in the spirits industry, the
Commission identified portfolio concerns stemming from the
fact that:
[P]ost-merger, if one or more additional leading brands are
added to an existing range this may strengthen the overall
position of the brand owner. Greater diversity of the product
range offered including leading brands improves the position
of the brand owner by giving him a series of leading products
which may be sold together and used to promote his secon-
dary brands.1 2
Under this type of commercial tying, the general level of
demand for the products in the product range can be expected
to increase, in the sense that a decrease in the price of one of
the complementary products may increase the demand for the
other complements in the range. For such an increase in de-
mand to be profitable, the merged firm may render the price
reduction contingent on customers taking the whole range of
complementary products. This type of commercial tying may
produce a short-term welfare increase for those customers who
choose to buy the range at a reduced price, and a welfare reduc-
tion for those who prefer to buy stand-alone products at higher
prices. In the long term, however, welfare may be adversely af-
fected when competitors are foreclosed, marginalized, or elimi-
nated from the market and when the merged firm subsequently
has the ability to raise prices, without fearing re-entry. Such con-
cerns were considered by the Commission in the Pernod Ricard/
Diageo/Seagram Spirits decision as stemming from the fact that a
"greater portfolio diversity and the subsequent listing of the par-
ties' weaker brands reduce the opportunities for competing sup-
pliers whose products may be then de-listed by retailers." 3
Conglomerate mergers may render this type of tying possi-
ble as a result of cross-subsidization between the different prod-
ucts in the combined product range. In addition, where the
merger brings about significant financial strength, the ability of
the merged firm to cross-subsidize discounts across the comple-
11. Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, O.J. L 288/24 (1998).
12. Pernod Ricard/Diageo/Seagram Spirits, Case No. COMP/M.2268 (May 8,
2001).
13. Id.
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mentary products in the product range may also come from
profits made on products outside that range.
C. Technical Tying
Conglomerate mergers may also produce anticompetitive
effects when they enable the merged firm to engage in technical
tying. Technical tying may become possible when, as a result of
the merger, the complementary products become available only
as an integrated system that is incompatible with competing indi-
vidual components. Such a practice may be found in industries
that manufacture intermediate products that are subsequently
assembled either by the final buyer or by intermediate down-
stream agents (for example, in the automotive, aerospace, and
computer industries). When the merging parties enjoy market
power in one or more of their complementary products, techni-
cal tying can have the effect of foreclosing competing suppliers
of individual components, by denying them the possibility to sell
their intermediate products alongside the other products of the
merged firm. This can potentially reduce their profitability and
adversely affect their incentives to compete. In the recent Boe-
ing/Hughes case, the Commission examined whether the merged
entity could engage in technical tying by making its complemen-
tary products (satellite interfaces and launchers) incompatible
with competing products.14 The Commission found that in the
absence of market power in either of the complementary prod-
ucts and in the presence of buyer power, the merged firm would
not have the ability to engage in technical buying.
On the basis of the above description of the various forms of
leveraging practices, it can be concluded that conglomerate
mergers may produce anticompetitive effects under certain well-
defined circumstances.
Conglomerate mergers may result in the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position through the leverage of
market power from one product market into another, closely re-
lated, product market where market power does not necessarily
exist before the merger.
The extent of the competitive harm of conglomerate merg-
ers depends on the industry concerned. Thus, conglomerate
14. Boeing/Hughes, Case No. COMP/M.1879 (Oct. 29, 2000).
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mergers in industries which display imperfect competition, high
sunk costs, high entry or expansion barriers, imperfect capital
markets, and so forth, are more likely to lead to the permanent
exclusion of competitors and the subsequent monopolization of
the market by the merged firm. Conversely, conglomerate merg-
ers may not lead to competitive harm when the merging firms
lack sufficient market power or when the quality and immediacy
of the competitive response of rivals can make the merged firm's
leveraging practices unprofitable. Finally, conglomerate merg-
ers may fall short of competitive harm when buyers possess a suf-
ficient amount of countervailing power and when, on balance,
the benefits from significant and substantial efficiency gains
clearly and unconditionally outweigh the potential competitive
harm.
II. THE ASSESSMENT OF CONGLOMERATE EFFECTS IN THE
GE/HONEYWELL CASE
Against that more theoretical and policy background, it is
important to address the substance of the case that has probably
received the most attention over the last few months if not years:
the GE/Honeywell transaction.15
I am sure you will recall that it was in the middle of an in-
tense press coverage and political debate on both sides of the
Atlantic that the European Commission declared the proposed
merger between General Electric ("GE") and Honeywell incom-
patible with the Common Market on the July 3, 2001. This deci-
sion came at the end of an in-depth investigation which resulted
in the finding that the combination of the leading aircraft en-
gine maker with the leading avionics/non-avionics manufacturer
would create and/or strengthen dominant positions in the vari-
ous relevant markets in which the merging companies are active.
There remains much controversy about the Commission's
reasoning and its incentives for blocking what was once an-
nounced as the largest industrial merger ever. Now that some,
but understandably not all, of the dust has settled and that the
Commission decision has been made public via the Commis-
sion's website,16 it might be the right time to have a deeper look
15. See GE/Honeywell, Case No. COMP/M.2220 (2001).
16. See The European Commission, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/in-
dex en.htm.
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at it in order to understand its basics, set the record straight as
far as its rationale is concerned, and, if possible, put an end to
the misunderstandings that have surrounded the case.
I contend that the GE/Honeywell merger, in its effects, as
analyzed by the Commission, is not a "portfolio effects" case. It
is regrettable, indeed, that many antitrust and other commenta-
tors rushed to criticize the Commission for having applied "off-
the-wall" theories, undoubtedly referring to a "portfolio effects"
analysis, which, as explained earlier, the Commission has already
used in certain circumstances. Indeed, while there is no doubt
about the conglomerate nature of the case given both the com-
plementary nature of the products and services involved as far as
aerospace is concerned, as well as the common customer base of
the parties, the effects identified by the Commission rest more
with the implementation and transfer of GE's toolkit for domi-
nance to Honeywell's products rather than with genuine portfo-
lio effects.
Before I explain in more detail the "red line" of the Com-
mission's reasoning, let me stress the critical importance of this
very message as being an attempt, hopefully successful and com-
prehensive, within the limits of the respect of business secrets
and of the sub judice status of the case, to bring to light the facts
and arguments used by the Commission in the GE/Honeywell
case.
A. The Commission's Case in a Nutshell
The core factor of the Commission's competitive assessment
of the merger is the combination of GE's financial strength and
vertical integration into aircraft purchasing, financing, and leas-
ing with Honeywell's leading positions in various product mar-
kets, such as corporate jet engines, avionics, and non-avionics
products.
Similar to how GE has built its dominant position in the
large civil engine markets, the Commission's assessment of the
case led to the conclusion that it would not take long for GE to
transform Honeywell's already strong leadership in the markets
for corporate jet engines, avionics, and non-avionics products
into genuine dominant positions.
2002]
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B. GE'S Toolkit for Market Dominance
GE's current dominant positions in the markets for engines
for both large commercial and large regional jet aircraft indeed
result from the combination of a series of factors that, following
the transaction, would have been made directly available to Hon-
eywell, where not already available to Honeywell, such as its lead-
ing market position. Together with GE's consistently high and
increasing market shares for engines, the factors that contribute
to GE's dominance are its vertical integration into aircraft
purchasing, financing and leasing, its financial strength through
GE Capital (GE's financial arm), as well as its strong position in
the aftermarket services.
C. GE Capital was a Factor
Against that background, and quite apart from its high mar-
ket shares, one must agree that GE, which has the world's largest
market capitalization,' 7 can be characterized as a rather unique
company. Indeed, GE is not only a leading industrial conglom-
erate active in many areas including aerospace and power sys-
tems, but also a major financial organization through GE Capi-
tal, which contributes roughly half of GE Corporation's consoli-
dated revenues and manages over U.S.$370 billion, more than
eighty percent of GE's total assets."
The Commission's investigation confirmed that GE Capital
offers GE businesses enormous financial means almost instanta-
neously and enables GE to take higher risks in product develop-
ment programs than any of its competitors. The Commission's
investigation further confirmed that this ability to absorb prod-
uct failures in an industry characterized by long-term invest-
ments is critical.
The importance of the financial strength in this industry,
through the heavy discounts on the initial sales of engines, a
practice that resulted in moving the break-even point of an en-
gine project further away from the commercial launch of an air-
craft platform, helped GE, thanks to its enormous balance sheet,
17. GE's market capitalization of U.S.$480 billion (as ofJune 1, 2001) is far greater
than other companies active in the commercial aircraft market, such as Boeing
(roughly U.S.$56 billion), UTC (U.S.$39 billion), and RR (U.S.$5 billion).
18. If GE Capital were an independent company, it would, on its own, rank in the
Top Twenty of the Fortune 500 largest corporations.
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establish its dominant position. Indeed, by increasing this delay
in the inception of cash flows and consequently by increasing its
competitors' needs to resort to external financial means further
raising their leverage19 and resulting borrowing costs,2 ° GE
made its competitors, most of which are specialized single-prod-
uct companies, particularly vulnerable to any economic down-
turn or strategic mistake.
More importantly, the Commission's investigation revealed
that, thanks to its financial strength and incumbency advantages
as an engine supplier, GE can afford to provide significant finan-
cial support to airframe manufacturers under the form of plat-
form-program development assistance that its rivals have not
been, historically, in a position to replicate. GE has indeed used
this direct financial support to obtain exclusivity for its products
on those airframes that it has financially assisted, thereby perma-
nently depriving competitors from access to such airframes.21
GE's enormous financial capacity also contributes to its fur-
ther growth and strengthens its position in the very lucrative part
of the engine business by investing large amounts of money for
several years into the aftermarket through the purchase of a sig-
nificant number of repair shops all over the world.
D. GECAS was a Factor
Another key factor contributing to GE's dominance is its
vertical integration into aircraft purchasing, financing, and leas-
ing activities through GE Capital Aviation Services ("GECAS").
GECAS is the largest purchaser of new aircraft, ahead of any in-
dividual airline or other leasing company.22 GECAS is also re-
ported to have the largest single fleet of aircraft in service, as
19. That is, the debt/equity ratio.
20. One illustration of this significant competitive advantage enjoyed by GE over
its industrial rivals resides in its AAA credit rating, which extends to all of its subsidiar-
ies. This enables them to borrow on better terms and obtain credit faster than competi-
tors.
21. GE has secured a total of ten exclusive positions out of the last twelve that were
granted by airframe manufacturers. GE did not take part in the other two.
22. As far as large commercial aircraft are concerned, GECAS accounted for a little
over ten percent of Boeing's order book with 135 aircraft on order at the time of the
Commission's investigation. The figure was equivalent for Airbus with a total GECAS
backlog of some 138 aircraft. Southwest Airlines was reported to have the largest back-
log of all individual airlines with a total of 144 large commercial aircraft. The next
largest order backlog from an airline was that of Delta with 108 aircraft on order.
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well as the largest share of aircraft on order and aircraft purchas-
ing options.
As many readers are probably aware, GECAS is unlike any
other independent leasing company in that it does not select
equipment on the aircraft that it purchases in accordance with
market demand. As a result of GECAS' policy of selecting only
GE engines when purchasing new aircraft, ninety-nine percent
of the large commercial aircraft ordered by GECAS are GE-pow-
ered. 23 The Commission's in-depth investigation indicated that
GECAS has the incentive and the ability to enhance the market
position of the GE Aircraft Engine division ("GEAE") through
various means.
As a launch customer, GECAS can influence the selection of
aircraft equipment by the airframe manufacturers and therefore,
in combination with other GE features, tilt the balance in favor
of its being retained as the exclusive equipment and service sup-
plier.2 4 Unlike any other engine manufacturer, GE can afford to
pay in order to obtain exclusivity and hence capture aftermarket,
leasing, and financial revenues. From an airframe manufac-
turer's perspective, selecting GE can give access to the largest
customer base of airlines and can secure a significant, either
launch or boost, order of its aircraft by GECAS.
GEAE's competitors have been unable to offer comparable
launch or boost orders and purchases to airframe manufactur-
ers. The role of GECAS as a launch or boost customer has
proven particularly effective in obtaining access and/or exclusiv-
ity to new aircraft platforms, as illustrated by GE's exclusive posi-
tion on the Boeing 777X. In addition, GECAS has also proven
to be a very effective tool in strengthening GE's position with
airlines on those platforms where there is engine choice.
Our market investigation further showed that GECAS has
the ability to standardize airlines' fleets around GE-powered air-
craft, hence persuading airlines that would not otherwise have
leased a GE-powered aircraft to accept such an aircraft. Finally,
our investigation confirmed that the ability of GECAS to shift
market shares by seeding airlines with GE-powered aircraft has,
23. The remainder is accounted for by eight Boeing 757s for which GE has no
engine on offer.
24. GECAS is one of the two leasing companies that operate as launch customers
as these companies can order multiple aircraft at one time, and wait the extra time for
delivery of a new airframe.
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owing to the constraints of fleet and equipment commonality, a
multiplying effect. Indeed, such airlines will continue to
purchase GE engines in the future, therefore multiplying GE's
share of the market.
Let me be clear, because this is key to the Commission's
reasoning, no other engine manufacturer has the vertical inte-
gration, size, and financial strength to respond to such offers
only on competition on the merits. As a result, by using the
purchasing leverage of GECAS, GE has been able to shift jet en-
gine market shares to the benefit of GEAE.
The Commission could not accept the contention that the
influence of GECAS could be replicated easily and rapidly by
GE's competitors through, inter alia, the setting-up of their own
aircraft leasing subsidiaries. The Commission's investigation
therefore confirmed that such a counter-move on behalf of com-
peting engine manufacturers could not constrain GE's leader-
ship on the engine markets.
E. Interim Conclusion on GE's Ability to Become Dominant
Given the nature of the jet engines market, characterized by
high barriers to entry and expansion, GE's incumbent position
with many airlines, its incentive to use GE Capital's financial
power with customers, its ability to leverage its vertical integra-
tion through GECAS, the limited countervailing power of cus-
tomers, and the comparatively weaker position of its rivals, GE
was considered to be in a position to behave independently of its
competitors, customers, and ultimately consumers and thus to
be a dominant firm in the markets for large commercial jet air-
craft engines and for large regional jet aircraft engines.
F. The Effects on Honeywell, at the Core of the Commission Decision
By extending those GE features just described to Honey-
well's aerospace products, the proposed merger would have led
to the creation of dominant positions in several markets as a re-
sult of the combination of Honeywell's leading market positions
with GE's financial strength and vertical integration in aircraft
purchasing, financing, leasing, and aftermarket services.
For example, consider supplier-furnished equipment
("SFE"). These are products selected on an exclusive basis by
the airframe manufacturer and supplied as standard equipment
2002]
902 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:885
for the life cycle of an aircraft. Consequently, for a supplier of
SFE, its initial selection on a platform can guarantee a long-term
source of revenues. Following the proposed merger, Honeywell
would have immediately benefited from GE Capital's incentive
and capability to secure exclusive supply positions for its prod-
ucts, thereby permanently excluding rivals from a large chunk of
the market.
In addition to that, and similar to GE engines, Honeywell's
products would have also benefited, as a result of the proposed
transaction, from the role of GECAS as a significant purchaser of
aircraft and from its business practice of promoting GE products
and services. Post-merger, GECAS would indeed have had a
strong incentive to extend its GE-only policy from engines to avi-
onics and non-avionics. Furthermore, thanks to GE's strong
cash flow, resulting from the conglomerate's leading positions in
several markets, following the merger Honeywell would have
been in a position to benefit from GE's financing strength and
ability to cross-subsidize across its various business segments, in-
cluding the ability to engage in temporary predatory behavior.
In light of these elements, the strategic use by GE of the
considerable market access enjoyed by GECAS and of the finan-
cial strength of GE Capital in favor of the products of Honeywell
would have positioned Honeywell as the dominant supplier in
the markets for SFE avionics and non-avionics where it already
enjoyed leading positions with high market shares.
By the same token, rival avionics and non-avionics manufac-
turers would have been deprived of future revenue streams gen-
erated by the sales of original equipment and spare parts. As
previously mentioned, future internally generated financial
means are key to this industry, as they are needed to fund devel-
opment expenditures for future products, foster innovation, and
enable possible leapfrogging. By being progressively marginal-
ized, as a result of the integration of Honeywell into GE, Honey-
well's competitors would have been deprived of a vital source of
revenue and would have seen their ability to invest for the future
and develop the next generation of aircraft systems substantially
reduced, to the detriment of innovation, competition, and thus
consumer welfare.
These are the kind of effects that were at the heart of the
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Commission's concerns. I believe they had little to do with a
genuine "portfolio effect" theory.
G. Related Elements
Now that I hope you have gained a better insight into the
Commission's analysis, which did not simply rely on bundling
and portfolio theories, let me address two further elements,
which are important to understanding the Commission's case.
1. Exit of Competitors
The Commission made many statements about GE and
Honeywell's competitors throughout the entire review process of
this case. One particular feature that was extensively debated
had to deal with their so-called exit or disappearance from the
market. While straight exit is not a remote or impossible event
in this market, I would like to make clear that exit of competi-
tors, in the sense the Commission has interpreted it, does not
require a general shut-down of the competitors' activities or a
total disappearance of their corporate existence.
Exit, as it must be read in the Commission's GE/Honeywell
decision, may indeed occur in relation to specifically identified
product markets rather than to a broader industry, such as aero-
space. What the Commission argued, however, was not that ri-
vals would vanish shortly after the implementation of the
merger, but rather that some of them would make rational eco-
nomic decisions to no longer invest in some of the segments of
the industry where they had been active. This type of decision is
hardly unusual in the business world. Companies tend to re-ori-
entate their activities as a general response to evolving market
conditions. They pull back from specific segments of the mar-
kets and refocus on other markets where they can still make a
reasonable profit. This is precisely what the Commission has
shown in its analysis of the GE/Honeywell merger, by establish-
ing a high likelihood that GE and Honeywell rivals would with-
draw from specific segments (particularly engines for large com-
mercial aircraft, or specific avionics and non-avionics) because of
their inability to compete on the merits in those specifically
identified markets which, from an antitrust perspective, consti-
tute the relevant product markets. Eventually, such stepping out
would have resulted in a substantial lessening of competition.
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2. Antitrust Protects Competition, Not Competitors
It would therefore be misleading to accept unconditionally
the overly simplistic position that competitors should never be
the focus of antitrust worries and that, if inefficient competitors
were driven out of the market, then consumers would be better
off overall.
I believe that most readers will agree that the purpose of
merger control is to prevent the accumulation of excessive mar-
ket power by one firm or a small number of firms. Additionally,
merger control needs to be concerned with the preservation of
competitive market structures, which may then benefit the con-
sumer as a result of competition. Having said that, I would hope
that you also agree that where competitors are squeezed out,
marginalized, or driven out of the market, they cannot offer any
credible competitive constraint to the dominant merged firms.
In other words, and subject to exceptional cases such as natural
monopolies, there can be no effective competition without com-
petitors. This is the reverse side of the so frequently heard adage
that antitrust is not about protecting competitors.
While there is nothing wrong in admitting that the competi-
tive process is about encouraging the more efficient firms to
grow at the expense of the less efficient, it might be prudent for
antitrust authorities not to unconditionally adopt such a Darwin-
ian theory, whereby competitors that are unable or unwilling to
meet the new competitive environment created through a con-
glomerate merger would have to leave the market. This argu-
ment is quite general in that it suggests that in every single in-
dustrial sector, inefficient competitors will be driven out of the
market and subsequently replaced by more efficient ones. Over-
all, this alternating between inefficient and efficient competitors
will leave no room for the merged firm to increase its prices
profitably and sustain such profit. This argument, however, dis-
regards the realities of certain markets, where market exit may
not be followed by new entry. In such a case, protecting the
competitive structure of an industry should not be confused with
the protection of inefficient competitors. This was precisely the
case with the GE/Honeywell merger, where high entry barriers
and very long industrial cycles did not favor entry. Once rivals
are marginalized or expelled from the market, they would re-
main in that position on a lasting basis. And this is precisely
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what we analyzed and confirmed during our in-depth investiga-
tion.
3. A False Efficiency Debate
The Commission has been under criticism that it looked
only at the creation of market power as a result of the proposed
merger, but not at any efficiencies that the combination of GE
and Honeywell would have brought about. Let me clarify the
Commission's position on this debate.
First, I would like to mention something that most of the
antitrust community will agree with. It would be rather far-
reaching to accept unconditionally that conglomerate mergers
promote efficiency and aggressive competition that benefit con-
sumers. While it is true that conglomerate mergers may have the
potential to generate efficiency gains in individual cases, as may
be the case with any other type of merger, there can be no pre-
sumption that such mergers generally and automatically gener-
ate such efficiencies.
A comparison between real, merger-specific efficiencies and
medium to long-term damage to the market has to be under-
taken, requiring a judgment call by antitrust authorities. Based
on that, I wish to categorically reject the criticism that the Euro-
pean Commission does not recognize an efficiency defense.
More specifically in the GE/Honeywell case, the merging parties
consistently argued that the merger would not create the type of
efficiencies that antitrust authorities have to rely upon: that is, a
long-term and structural reduction in the marginal cost of pro-
duction and distribution, which comes as a direct and immediate
result of the merger, which cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means and which reasonably will be passed on to the consumer
on a permanent basis, in terms of lower prices or increased qual-
ity.
On the contrary, the merging parties explained that the
merger would create cost savings, which can be naturally ex-
pected from any merger, as a result of the elimination of dupli-
cation. However, cost savings should not be viewed as equivalent
to merger-related efficiencies. They do not automatically lead to
sustainable and structural price reductions, but rather they lead
to increased margins for the firm, which cannot be expected to
automatically be passed on to consumers.
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4. Was Product Bundling an Efficiency or an
Exclusionary Practice?
While the effects resulting from the implementation of GE's
financial strength and vertical integration into aircraft financing,
leasing, and purchasing constitute the heart of the Commis-
sion's decision, I must recognize that the merged firm's incen-
tive and ability to foreclose competition through leveraging
practices, such as bundling and tying, would have also contrib-
uted to the creation and strengthening of dominant positions in
several of the relevant markets, such as the markets for buyer-
furnished equipment ("BFE") and SFE-option avionics and non-
avionics.
Indeed, given the parties' dominant or leading positions in
their respective markets, and the wide combination of comple-
mentary products that it could have offered, the merged entity
could have engaged in a number of foreclosure practices on the
markets for BFE and SFE-option avionics and non-avionics.
Sales of BFE and SFE-option products are made to airlines on a
regular basis, in particular each time an airline replaces or com-
plements its fleet of aircraft. On each of these occasions, the
merged entity could have foreclosed the selection of competing
BFE and SFE-option products by selling its own products, for in-
stance, as part of a broader package comprising engines and
GE's ancillary services such as maintenance, leasing, finance,
training and so forth.
As a result of the proposed merger, the merged entity would
have had the financial and technical ability as well as the eco-
nomic incentive to price its packaged deals in such a way as to
induce customers to buy GE engines and Honeywell BFE and
SFE-option products over those of competitors, thus increasing
its combined share in both markets. This would have occurred
as a result of, inter alia, the ability of the merged entity to cross-
subsidize strategic price reductions across the products compos-
ing the packaged deal.
In the short term, the merger would have affected suppliers
of BFE and SFE-option products. As BFE products are sold and
purchased on a regular basis, the merged entity's packaged of-
fers would manifest their effects immediately after the consum-
mation of the merger. Because of their lack of ability to match
the bundled offers, rival component suppliers would lose market
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shares to the benefit of the merged entity and experience an
immediate and damaging profit shrinkage. As a result, the
merger was likely to lead to market foreclosure on those existing
aircraft platforms and subsequently to the elimination, or at least
a substantial lessening, of competition in these areas.
In light of the above, when assessing efficiency claims in
conglomerate mergers it is vital to make the right trade-off, as
such mergers may give rise, among other effects, to leveraging
practices, which include product bundling. This type of leverag-
ing practice may involve an element of temporary price reduc-
tion, which under certain circumstances and market settings
may be used in order to carry out predatory strategies with the
objective of driving rivals out of the market. The trap here is
precisely the first leg of the functioning of bundling, voluntary
price reductions. While some would like to call and treat such
price decreases as structural and sustainable efficiencies, they
may actually be no more than strategic pricing behavior, which
can be made possible through cross-subsidization and price dis-
crimination.
The strong strategic element that they comprise is incom-
patible with the structural element, which is a necessary condi-
tion for consumer-benefiting efficiencies. Furthermore, the un-
dertakings proposed by the parties to address the concerns
raised by product bundling indicate that the parties themselves
did not believe in bundling as an efficiency-enhancing element.
The parties proposed a set of behavioral undertakings by which
they committed not to engage in bundled offers, unless there
was specific demand from customers. Doesn't this confirm the
idea that there were no real efficiencies stemming from bun-
dling but only a strategic incentive to use bundled offers where
they would help to reduce the competition, by winning platform
exclusivity, for instance?
5. Is Ex Ante Control the Only Way to Deal with Leveraging of
Market Power?
Let me now conclude with some remarks on a debate that
antitrust authorities are increasingly facing in the assessment of
conglomerate mergers. The question is articulated in the follow-
ing form: If leveraging practices are clear and easily detectable
abuses of a dominant position prohibited by antitrust laws (such
2002] 907
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
as Article 82 of the EC Treaty), why should we worry about them
in merger cases? In other words, why not wait until such prac-
tices have indeed occurred and challenge them later, using the
appropriate ex post antitrust laws?
Allow me to say that this is a false debate, which tends to put
in doubt the whole legal system of ex ante merger control policy.
While it is true that leveraging practices, such as product
tying, are per se abuses which fall under the scope of Article 82,
isn't the same true for abusive price increases or any other abuse
resulting from market dominance? Would this mean that ex ante
merger control should not bother to prevent the creation of
dominance because, in any case, its subsequent abuse can be
caught by the corrective and punishing mechanisms of specific
ex post legal provisions? The answer is certainly no.
Leveraging practices may have as a result the foreclosure of
rivals, that is, their gradual marginalization or exit from the mar-
ket or from some of its segments. In this respect, it is hardly
conceivable that the punishment mechanism of ex post instru-
ments can do anything to prevent such market foreclosure. In
other words, the imposition of fines on the dominant merged
firm, no matter how heavy they may be, cannot do much, if any-
thing, to reinstate the competitive thrust and constraint of weak-
ened or exiting rivals. The damage to competition will have al-
ready occurred and the legal system for prevention of the crea-
tion of market power, notably through an effective merger
control policy, will have failed.
CONCLUSION
The aim of ex ante merger control is to preserve competitive
market structures and this has to be pursued with a view pre-
cisely to eliminating the need for a more intrusive regulation of
market behavior, with all its attendant evils.
